This paper attempts to measure marginal effective tax rates in Korea for the past 45 years since 1960 in order to evaluate Korea's tax incentive policies. It is shown that marginal effective tax rates are manifest both negatively and positively, although mostly negative. This is a change compared to previous studies, due to high statutory tax rates and the low rate of debt financing after the economic crisis of 1997-8. While debt financing has been heavily subsidized, equity and retained earnings have not. Small and medium sized firms have been treated more favorably compared to their larger counterparts.
I. Introduction
As is well-known, economic development in Korea a government-led one. Korean government used all policy measures to promote the economic growth, and taxation was one of them. Therefore. tax policy together with many other policy measures, played an important role in Korean economic development. Especially, tax incentives were important policy measures because they can affect the investment behavior of firms through changes in real tax burden reduction of the cost of capital. As a matter of fact, many countries in the world heavily used tax incentives because of this aspect.
Korea was not an exception.
Tax incentives were widely used to support so-called 'key industries' during the 1960s and 1970s because those industries were essential to economic development in Korea.
Those industries were largely expport industries in '60s while they were heavy and chemical industries in '70s. In '80s, however, the stance of the Korean government toward tax incentive policies was changed. Along with the fundamental shift of the economic policy in favor of opening, less protection and regulation, Korean government began to rely less on tax incentives. Therefore, many of tax incentives were abolished during this period. Such stance has been maintained until now.
Establishment of WTO made this trend irreversible. Even with this change, there still remains many miscellaneous tax incentives although major ones remained are investment tax crefit and depreciation allowance. After the economic crisis hit this country in 1997, tax incentives to induce foreign direct investment have been used widely.
There are many kinds of tax incentives and the way to affect firms' investment behavior via the reduction of the cost of capital varies. In order to accurately assess the effect of tax incentives, the most poweful tool which can be used is the marginal effective tax rates. Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) , King and Fullerton (1983) are the the pioneering works in this area. In Korea, there have been a few researches on the marginal effective tax rates , such as, Kwak (1985) , Kim (1991) , Yoo(1995) , Yun and 3 Kim(1997), Kwack and Yoo(2000) , Yoo(1995) , and Won and Hyun (2000) . The marginal effective tax rate also has been a popular measure for the international comparison. Jorgenson and Landau (1993), and OECD (1991) are the notable examples. In particular, the framework of the marginal effective tax rate by King and Fullerton (1983) has been used as a benchmark for international comparison.
In this paper, it is attempted to measure marginal effective tax rates in Korea for the past 45 years since 1960 to evaluate Korea's tax incentive policies. Estimation results also could be used for the comparison of the effectiveness with financial subsidies (policy loan), which has been another powerful tool to promote economic growth. Methodology used in this paper is in line with such earlier works as Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981) , King and Fullerton (1983) , Jorgenson and Landau (1993) . It is also an extension of Hyun and Won (2000) with some differences in model and data. In Won and Hyun, fixed p (price) approach was used. In this paper, fixed r approach will be used and subsequent results will be compared with those of previous researches, particularly with Won and Hyun.
Rest of the paper will be organized as follows. In the next chapter, brief history of tax incentives in Korea is introduced. In chapter III, data used will be explained and marginal effective tax rates are computed. Findings are summarized and evaluated in the final chapter.
II. History of Tax incentives in Korea 1. Overview of Tax Incentives
Before discussing each tax incentive in detail, let us present a brief historical review of Korea's major tax incentive policies. In the early phase of the country's development, tax incentives played a relatively limited role in influencing business investment behavior, largely because of the prevailing market imperfections. It was only after 4 1966, the year in which the National Tax Administration was established, that tax incentives began to play a significant role in Korean economic development.
In the 1970s, more diversified and sophisticated tax incentives were provided during the course of the so-called heavy industrialization phase of the Korean economy, while incentives for export promotion were actually reduced in the early 1970s. During that decade, even though direct allocation continued to play a major role as the government increasingly let market forces play a bigger role in the allocation of resources, tax incentive policies began to receive increasing emphasis. Particularly in 1974, there was a major tax reform and all major incentives were unified and rearranged under the title of 'Special Tax Treatment for Key Industries' in the Tax Exemption and Reduction Control Law (TERCL).
In the 1980s, tax incentives began to be used less than before under the perception that they were being overly abused. First, some industries were removed from the beneficiary list. The 60% special depreciation system was completely abolished. The tax holiday option was abolished and the investment tax credit option was confined only to the machinery and electronics industries. At the same time, the investment tax credit rate was reduced to 6% (10% for investments using domestic capital goods) from 8% (10%). Effective from 1983, it was again halved to 3% (5% for investments using domestic capital goods) reflecting the downward adjustment of the statutory corporate tax rate.
After the Uruguay Round and the subsequent launch of the WTO, the aforementioned trend of declining tax incentives accelerated. Even in light of this and other unexplained changes however, many tax incentives are still in effect today. For example, there are major incentives such as reserves for investment for small and medium-sized enterprises, investment tax credits, and various incentives to induce foreign direct investment. In what follows, major tax incentives will be introduced in detail.
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Depreciation Rules
Korea's tax laws still maintain a traditional textbook depreciation system which tries to be exact in allocating the acquisition cost of a unit of capital over the actual period of its service. With few exceptions, fixed assets employed by corporate firms can be depreciated by either a fixed amount (straight line method), or fixed assets employed directly in the production activities and depreciated by the proportion of actual production (production method).
The Enforcement Ordinance of Corporation Tax Law provides detailed tables of an asset's useful life by asset type and industry. In addition, the ordinance stipulates a 10% scrap value which cannot be depreciated. The asset's useful life, listed in the ordinance are estimates of actual physical asset's useful life, although they have been slightly shortened a few times.
Tax Holiday
A very generous tax holiday system was introduced with the enactment of the Corporation Tax Law in 1949. According to this system, selected industries were classified into one of two groups. Based on this, two different tax holiday schedules were applied. The first group, which included oil refining, shipbuilding, iron and steelmaking, copper refining, cement manufacturing and chemical fertilizer manufacturing industries, was given a five-year corporate tax exemption of 100%. The second group, which included most of the mining and plate glass manufacturing industries, was given a three-year corporate tax exemption of 100%. During the early 1950s these incentives seem to have had only a limited effect, largely due to the Korean War and the negligible development of the heavy industries in the first group.
In 1954, benefit levels were substantially reduced and, after some minor changes, tax holidays for the key industries were completely abolished in 1968 (after an extensive revision of the Corporation Tax Law in 1967). Effective from 1969, however, a longer 6 tax holiday of six years with full exemption and a 50% exemption in the ensuing three years was given to the livestock breeding industry. Effective from 1970, a five-year full tax exemption was granted to naphtha-cracking and a few other related firms located in the petrochemical industrial park in accordance with the TERCL. Tax holidays were abolished in 1981, and have not been reintroduced.
Investment Tax Credit
The investment tax credit system was first introduced in 1968 as part of the package of reforms under the Corporation Tax Law enacted in 1967. A 6% investment tax credit was given to qualified firms operating in selected industries. The eligible industries included shipbuilding, iron and steel, chemical fertilizer, synthetic fibre, automobile, machinery, straw pulp, food processing, petrochemicals, electronic equipment, electrical machinery and equipment, construction, and some mining industries. This system replaced the tax holiday provided by the old tax law. Since tax holidays generally do not influence the level of investment in the replacement or expansion of production facilities, they may have had some distortional effects on the behavior of firms. In the sense that the introduction of investment tax credits was an improvement, but the actual benefit level was substantially reduced.
Effective from 1970, the TERCL provided a 6-10% investment tax credit for machinery and equipment investment to the iron and steel manufacturing industries, with the higher rate being applied to larger firms. With the tax reform of 1974, which went into effect in the following year, the two tax credits were replaced by special tax treatment for key industries.
Incentives for Export Promotion: Tax-free Reserves and Special Depreciation
From the earliest stage of Korea's economic development, the importance of foreign exchange was fully recognized by policy-makers, and so foreign exchange earning activities enjoyed substantial tax privileges, especially in the 1960s. In 1960, a 30% 7 corporate tax exemption was allowed on income from export businesses, and a 20% exemption was allowed on income from the sale of goods and services to foreign military forces based in Korea in addition to foreign currency income earned from tourist business. In the following year, this system was reinforced by raising the exemption rate to 50% covering all foreign-exchange-earning activities.
This incentive system played an important role in Korea's export-oriented industrialization in the 1960s. A 50% exemption on corporate taxes sounded very drastic and could have provoked counteractive protectionist measures from some importing countries, even though the absolute level of the effective corporate tax rate for exporters after the exemption was high, mainly due to the high inflation rate, the relatively low tax depreciation rate, the high discount rate, and the high statutory tax rate (30-45% plus surtaxes at the margin). However, the effective tax rate differential between exporting and domestic sectors created by the exemption was substantial and resources were favorably allocated to export sectors.
This system was replaced in 1973 by a two tax-free reserve system, which set up reserves for losses coming from export businesses and overseas market development.
The reserve for overseas marketing was actually introduced in 1969, but until 1973 its application was limited to 'green return' corporations that included public corporations that were formally listed on the stock market, and firms approved by the government for accurately reporting taxes. In 1973, this limitation was removed and so, all corporations engaged in export business were made eligible for this benefit. According to this system, 1% of total exports (2% for small and medium-sized firms) can be deducted from the amount of taxable income for tax-free reserves. After a two-year grace period, the amount is evenly spread over the following three years and added to the amount of taxable income.
The export loss reserve system was introduced in 1973. Its level was the same as the reserves for overseas marketing, except for the method of calculating the maximum reserve amount. Under this system, the reserve amount could not exceed the lesser of 8 either 1% of total exports (2% for small and medium-sized firms) or 50% of profits from export business.
Effective from 1977, a tax-free reserve system -reserves for price fluctuation -was added to the list of tax incentives for export promotion. The maximum amount that could be reserved for taxable income deduction was 5% of the inventory asset value at the end of the accounting period. The reserved amount was added to the amount of taxable income after a one-year grace period.
Finally, export incentives were provided in the form of a special depreciation.
Although this system was first introduced in 1962, export industries only began to receive special benefits from it in 1963. Machinery and equipment directly employed by foreign-exchange-earning activities could be depreciated at a rate of 30% higher than the corresponding statutory rate. Effective from 1967, two different special depreciation rates were applied to the export share in total sales: if the share was 50% or more, a special depreciation of 30 per cent was allowed; and if the rate was less than 50%, the applicable rate was 15%. Effective from 1971, the special depreciation rate for firms whose export shares were less than 50% was calculated by applying the formula (30% x export share x 2).
Economic Crisis and Tax Incentives
The economic crisis started in late 1997 has forced the government to initiate a series of comprehensive economic reform measures to overhaul the economy. As a part of such reforms, the government made a number of changes in the tax laws to facilitate the restructuring process, stimulate investment and consumption, and broaden the tax base and tax revenue.
(1) Tax measures for restructuring One of the most important reasons behind the crisis was excessive borrowing by firms.
Thus, the financial restructuring of the corporate and financial sector was inevitable.
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And tax liability should neither discourage nor prevent companies and financial institutions from undergoing necessary restructuring. Therefore, the government has exempted or reduced taxes on asset transactions used for the purpose of corporate and financial restructuring.
Tax incentives to encourage and accelerate restructuring were mostly granted to transaction-related taxes, such as capital gains tax, acquisition tax, and registration tax.
These incentives were intended to bring about corporate mergers and acquisitions, business divisions, asset swaps, alienation of business assets, and contribution by company owners. For example, profits resulting from a re-valuation of corporate assets after a merger or acquisition were eligible for deferral from corporate income tax until the alienation of the re-valued assets. Corporate mergers and acquisitions are also exempt from the registration tax. Registration Tax) for a minimum of 5 years as well as a reduction of 50% for the next 3 years. Imported capital goods are also eligible for full or partial exemptions from customs duty, the special excise tax, and VAT.
With the additional measures to attract FDI, Korea opened up the long-protected real estate market completely to foreign investors in June 1998. In an effort to attract largescale foreign investment, the government also introduced a Foreign Investment Zones (FIZ). Unlike in the past when the national government granted tax incentives to induce FDIs in pre-designated areas, the FIPA has given local governments autonomy to designate FIZs upon request from foreign investors based on the amount of investment and the number of expected jobs to be created as a result of FDI. Foreign invested companies that are designated as FIZs are eligible for government support and tax benefits.
Tax incentives were provided to small and medium-sized companies to stimulate employment and technology investment. They include tax exemptions on stock options, tax credit and exemptions on R&D, lower special excise tax on consumer electronic goods and automobiles, lower automobile tax, and lower capital gains tax. For example, for employees of venture capital companies who take stock options, the individual income tax on income from stock options is exempted. economic distortion by using the marginal effective tax rate. King and Fullerton (1984) (1991), Kwack (1985) , Won (1996 ), Yoo (1995 , and Yun and Kim (1997).
However, these studies do not cover enough years to explain the trend of tax incentive policies in Korea. Kwack (1985) , and Yun and Kim (1997) analyze relatively longer periods than the others, and are worthwhile to mention the general trend of tax incentive policies in Korea. These two studies focused on two separate time periods (1960~1983 and 1983~1995 respectively) . Reviewing the economic effects of tax incentives using the marginal effective tax rate, it was found that the effects of incentives were relatively large between 1962 -1967 and also between 1972-1981 . Indeed, it was as large as 29 percent in 1979, the highest level of tax relief ever. The level of tax relief by tax incentive was highest in machinery and equipment, small and medium firms, and debt financing, in that respective order. The results indicate the possibility of an inefficient allocation of tax incentives among the different resources, and combinations should be carefully selected to design the most efficient policy mix.
Previous empirical studies assessing Korea's tax incentive policies give us an explanation about the general trend. However, periods covered in those researches were relatively short. Thus, it nis necessary to extend the covered period so that effects of the tax incentives in Korea could be analyzed in a consistent manner. First of such attempts was Won and Hyun (2000) . They covered 39 years using King and Fullerton's fixed p approach. We extend the previous empirical studies to 45 years, ranging from 1960 to 2004, by using fixed r approach. Because of the adoption of different approach, this analysis brings out somewhat different results from theirs.
Let's summarize King and Fullerton's approach which is used for this analysis. King and Fullerton's framework is based on the concept of a tax wedge (w), which is defined as the difference between before-tax (p) and after-tax rate of return (s) as follows:
The marginal effective tax rate (t) can be expressed as the ratio of the tax wedge to the before-tax rate of return:
Where the tax wedge can be divided into two components; one is corporate tax wedge (w c ) and the other is personal tax wedge (w p ). Thus total tax wedge (w) has the following relationship with the two components:
Before tax rate of return p should be equated to the difference between the economic depreciation rate (δ ) and the before tax rate of return, which is equal to the marginal rate of return of the investment. Thus, we have the following:
Now, the present value of the after tax return V fore tax rate is expressed as follows:
Where τ is statutory corporate income tax rate, π is the rate of inflation, ρ is the discount rate for the income flow.
3
Cost of the capital for the marginal investment c is equal to the difference between unit cost of capital and the (pecuniary) effects of tax incentives. Here, we consider only three of major tax incentives; investment tax credit, legal depreciation, and special (accelerated) depreciation. Rates of each tax incentives are denoted as k, d, s. Thus we have the following formulae where z' is the present value of the depreciation (including accelerated depreciation).
Since the marginal revenue after tax should be equated to the marginal cost to maximize profit, the following equation should hold at the equilibrium.
Individual investors would like to maximize after tax rate of return s. To do this, one of the following equations should hold depending on the way how that marginal investment is financed, i.e., debt, equity, and retention.
Where i m is the (seperate) marginal income tax rate on the finacial income, d m is the marginal income tax rate, and g m is the marginal capital gains tax rate. Also, e is the prooportion of the dividend income taxed separately, while θ is the net dividend rate reflecting the effect of the adjustment of the double taxation. Now, the after (corporate) tax rate of return q should satisfy one of the following two equations depending on the financial source of the investment.
The corporate tax wedge (w c ) is defined as the difference between the before-tax rate of return (p) and the after-corporate, before-personal tax rate of return (q). Thus, the marginal effective corporate tax rate (t c ) can be expressed as follows:
The personal tax wedge (w p ) is defined as the difference between the after-corporate, before-personal tax rate of return (q) and the after-tax rate of return (s). Thus the marginal effective personal tax rate (t p )
can be expressed as follows:
We estimate the marginal effective corporate tax rate, the marginal effective personal tax rate, and the marginal effective tax rate in the following way. Since the fixed r approach is adopted, 's according to sources of investment, which give the same value of s first computed in equation (6) with given parameters such as inflation rate, statutory tax rates, and so on. With these 's p's will be calculated using (5). q,s are calculated using (6), (7). Then, effective tax rates are calculated by (8), (9).
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Data
In this paper, we attempt to estimate the marginal effective tax rates for 45 years ranging from 1960 to 2004. Since 1960 was the year that the real growth of Korean economy began, it would be a good starting point for the estimation. Besides, it is impossible to get the reliable data necessary for the estimation in '50s or before.. Even the period of early '60s, there are several variables hard to acquire.
It was inevitable either to estimate or to make assumptions on those parameters.
We focus only on the manufacturing industry in Korea, here. There are several reasons for this. The first one is data availability. Second, the manufacturing industry has played a leading role in economic growth in Korea. This industry has been regarded as the representative industry. Third, most of the tax incentives are used for the manufacturing industry 1 .
As mentioned, fixed r approach is used in this paper. Therefore, we need the information on the inflation rate and the 'market' interest rate unlike the case of the fixed p approach. For the former, we used the GDP deflator. For the latter, it is really hard to define the 'market' interest rate because the capital market in Korea was not developed till '80s. Thus, we cannot but use the loan rate for the firms' expenses by the Korea Development Bank till 1986. From 1987 on, the corporate bond rate is used because that rate has been made public from that year.
Tax incentives differ by firm sizes, type of assets, and source of finance. We calculate the marginal effective tax rate by these factors separately first . Then, the aggregated tax rates will be calculated by using the weighted mean of parameters (according to the weight found in data sources). The three factors are as follows:
(1) Firm size: Large firm, small and medium sized firm Information on tax rates (corporate income, personal, capital gains, separate tax on interest and dividend), depreciation rate, and investment tax credit are all drawn from tax codes. To make analysis simple and tractable, a lot of assumptions were made. For example, it is assumed that higher corporate tax rate is applied to large corporations, while the lower rate is applied to the small corporations 2 . It is also assumed that the capital gains tax rate is equal to the personal (individual) income tax rate. We used the average of the tax lifetimes for buildings, and machinery and equipment in calculating legal depreciation rate because there are many different for assets in each category. Economic depreciation rates for the building is assumed to be 3.39%, and that of machine and equipment is 16.2%, following Yun and Kim 3 . Investment tax credit has been applied differently by types of firms. While this incentive has been applied to all firms, there was additional benefit applied only to small and medium firms with two alternative credits. Other important tax incentives such as tax holiday, tax free reserves are not included here because they are no longer used. <Table A1> shows a summary of the tax incentive measures over the last 45 years in Korea.
Information about financial structures of firms are drawn from Financial Statement Analysis (FAS)
published annually by the Bank of Korea. They are a ratio of each financial sources (debt, equity, and retained earnings) with respect to total invest amounts. We also get information about investment patterns of the manufacturing industry by type of assets, which are buildings, machinery and equipment, and others. <Table A2> shows the details of this information.
One problem with this is that Bank of Korea no longer provides this information from 1999.
Therefore, we must make an assumption on this. One way to deal with this problem is that the weight structure after 1998 has been same as the one in 1998. Or, Estimation can be done by regression or taking averages to get the estimates of such weights. Neither of them is satisfactory because there has not been any stable trend among these weights. Particularly, after the economic crisis in 1997, total outstanding debt has been reduced drastically. Therefore, it is natural to assume that the weight of the debt financing is decreased. Reflecting this, it is assumed here that the weight of 1 7
debt financing since 1999 is fixed at the half of that in 1998. Rest of the weights are calculated according to the relative weights in 1998 so that sum of them be equal to 1.
IV. Findings and Evaluation
1) Borrowing has been treated favorably at the stage of corporate taxes as can be seen in the table.
Naturally, borrowing is to be treated favorably since the interest payment is included in the cost and deducted from the tax base. As a matter of fact, borrowing is subsidized as can be seen from the negative signs of the effective corporate tax rates. Although, it is the result that could be found in most other researches on Korean marginal effective tax rates, their sizes are generally bigger than those of previous researches, including Won and Hyun. Particularly, in years 1975-80 , the absolute values of marginal effective corporate tax rates are very big greater than 0.8. This is very big, which is comparable to the case of Italy reported in Jorgenson and Landau, whose absolute value is around 1.
In fact, marginal effective corporate tax rates of borrowing for big firms are less than -1 4 .
2) The marginal effective tax rates of equity and retained earnings are mostly positive. This result is not surprising. One interesting thing is that the marginal effective tax rates of retained earnings during ---are very high. It is because (statutory) marginal income tax rates were so high that the discount rate used in calculating marginal effective tax rates were high.
3) (Weighted) Marginal effective tax rates show mixed signs. Although they are mostly negative, some of them have positive signs. This is somewhat different result from previous researches, particularly that of Hyun and Won, where they are all negative. This is due to several reasons: First, the statutory tax rates were high, which worked to increase marginal effective tax rates. Second, although statutory tax rates are lowered substantially, proportion of borrowing has been reduced sharply after the economic crisis in 1997-8. The effect of the latter change was so big that the resulting marginal effective tax rates have become larger. 4) In this paper, as in Hyun and Won, only investment tax credit and special depreciation were covered in calculating marginal effective tax rates. Other major tax incentives, however, tax holiday, export loss reserve, etc., should be included in
calculation. This will be the topic for the future research.
5) Between types of firms, there have not been clear trends of distinction till the '80s, although the small corporations seem to be treated more favorably. This trend becomes clearer after 1998 (after economic crisis). As was mentioned, most of tax incentives have been concentrated to small corporations during this period (except for those to induce FDI). This is the reason behind such phenomenon.
6) Compared to the results of Won and Hyun, our result shows that the marginal corporate tax rates are generally lower when inflation was stabilized while they are higher when the inflation rates were high. They are also higher in those years that either (statutory) marginal income tax rates or corporate income tax rates are high. Since the actual inflation rate is used in calculating effective tax rates in fixed r approach, our estimates are fluctuated more than those of Won and Hyun where the inflation rate is assumed to be fixed at 5%. corporate tax rate in Korea shows that they have been somewhat effective, but not very much (see Kwack and Yoo (1994) ). Yoo (1995) showed that investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation were powerful. Other measures, particularly the policy loan (credit support), have been argued to be far more effective than tax incentives (see Cho and Kim, 1994).
9) As was pointed out repeatedly, this analysis relies on many (sometimes heavy) assumptions. Although this is a common phenomenon in this kind of analysis and it does not lose that much generality in analyzing trends of the effects by tax incentives, it cannot be denied that it is a main limitation. To extend this analysis with less of such assumptions will also be the topic of the future research., 
